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BOOK REVIEW
Law and the Environment. MALCOLM F. BALDWIN AND JAMES K. PAGE,
JR. (EDS.). New York: Walker &cCo. 1970. Pp. xviii, 432. $15.00.
Since one of the attributes of the "post-industrial society"' is the
compression of events along a temporal axis, it should not come as a
surprise to attorneys that the stately historic evolution of common law
doctrine has become somewhat frantic of late, especially in regard to
doctrines that concern technological developments. While we have not
yet experienced "instant common law," the trend is certainly in that
direction. In large measure, of course, this is not because the internal
dynamic of the law has mutated; instead, it expresses the legitimate
function of the legal process in dealing with and reflecting real world
developments. As the latter accelerate and produce the compressed impacts we have come to call crises, the legal mechanism, as one of the
social "support systems, ' 2 must respond accordingly.
Another notable aspect of our modem culture is its synthetic
quality. Everything is "plastic" rather than natural, the complaint
reads. Along with manufactured and manipulated wants and expectations, developed and nurtured by the advertisers and the media, we
might expect to observe the appearance of "synthetic law," readily
produced according to the blueprint specifications of specialized interests in the technological area. Of course, one's jurisprudential outlook will determine one's interpretation of the origin and functions
of laws; in my opinion, older legal doctrines were often created and nurtured in correspondence to the needs of identifiable social interests.
However, legal novelties, like technological ones, may have a considerably greater impact today than in earlier times, and we may be in
a better position to observe the process by which such doctrines are
created and developed.
Environmental law is a relatively new area of interest and may be
suspect as being both instant and synthetic. While Law and the Environment is a unique and important work in this area, unfortunately
it does little to allay such doubts.
In September 1969, a conference on the legal aspects of environmental control was convened at Airlie House in northern Virginia by
1 The phrase may have originated with Bell, Notes on the Post-Industrial Society
(pts. 1-2), PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1967, at 24; PUB. INTERMsT, Spring 1967, at 102.
2 See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, COMMrrrEE ON SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY,
TECHNOLOGY: PROCESSES OF ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE 16 (1969).
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the Conservation Foundation and the Conservation and Research
Foundation. Most of the attorneys, law professors, and conservationists
who were involved with questions of environmental law at that time
attended, and the present book consists essentially of the record of the
conference proceedings, both commissioned papers and discussion sessions.
Interdisciplinary activities, although au courant, present several
considerable difficulties. One of the more obvious of these problems is
that relating to communication. The first hurdle is to facilitate interaction among the participants themselves, but after these individuals
have been playing the game for a while they may have begun to assimilate enough of each others' jargon to make the process feasible. When
the product of an interdisciplinary session is sent forth into the world,
however, its message must be carefully tailored to preconceived groups
of potential recipients if it is to be understood by any.
It is difficult to identify the composition of the expected readership
of Law and the Environment. Conference papers inherently appeal to
fairly limited and discrete audiences. They usually present illustrations
of what specialists in the field are doing, and as such are of primary
interest to other specialists. Thus, they presuppose some shared background to serve as a framework for the more technical matters they
deal with. In the present instance, one wonders whether a reader without some legal knowledge as well as environmental savvy can handle
the material in the book. While the work has intrinsic merit as a historical record, the question must be raised-in spite of the phenomenal
increase in public concern about these issues-whether the conference
participants did not largely exhaust the potential audience subset that
could comprehend the subject matter fully.
A paper such as David Sive's "Securing, Examining and CrossExamining Expert Witnesses in Environmental Cases" s will be incomprehensible to the general membership of his own Sierra Club. To
make such a statement is in no way meant to denigrate the importance
of this article, either as a contribution to legal scholarship or as practical assistance to the litigating environmental attorney. Sive has, of
course, written about this field for the layman 4 and lectured extensively
to many groups, but on such, occasions he chooses his specific topics
and words accordingly.
3

P. 48. This article is also printed in 68 MICH. L. REv. 1175 (1970).
4 For example, Sive, The Environment: Is It Protected by the Bill of Rights, CrvIL
LimmERs, April 1970, at 8.
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Other examples can be given. Two articles are of interest solely to
persons concerned with law school curricula, a rather specialized involvement.5 James Krier has written a piece about the crucial issues of
burden of proof,6 but my teaching experience indicates that this is a
difficult and technical topic for laymen. Berlin, Roisman, and Kessler
attempt to expand the notion of the public trust,7 basing their paper
on the recent major work by Joseph Sax on this topic,8 but it is still a
sophisticated, if not esoteric, endeavor.
Some of the papers are more suitable for the novice. Harold Green
provides a general perspective9 and Louis Jaffe deals with standing,
managing to avoid a rehash of the large literature that has emerged on
this doctrine. 0 My colleague E. F. Roberts introduces philosophical
considerations in a paper covering the constitutional dimensions of the
movement's activities." Baldwin presents a case study to illuminate
the political machinations that invariably accompany environmental
controversies.' 2 And James Moorman avowedly directs his attention to
the needs of the general bar.'8 Finally, if the layman is still bewildered,
the book includes a valuable bibliography.1 4
The transcript of the discussion sessions' 5 is excellent, but here it
is keenly evident that the reader must have a broader legal background
than that provided by the papers. That is, the give-and-take cannot be
fully appreciated if one's knowledge of the field is limited to the covers
of the book.
5 Corbridge, An Interdisciplinary Program for Law Students in the Environmental
Field, p. 289; Tarlock, Current Trends in the Development of an Environmental Curricu-

lum, p. 297.
o Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, p. 105.
7 Law in Action: The Trust Doctrine, p. 166.
8 Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MxcH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
9 The Role of Government in Environmental Conflict, p. 235.
10 Standing To Sue in Conservation Suits, p. 123.
11 The Right to a Decent Environment: Progress Along a Constitutional Avenue,
p. 134.
12 The Santa Barbara Oil Spill, p. 5. This article has been somewhat revised to reflect
passage of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U..C.A. §§ 1161-71 (1970).
13 Outline of Federal Environmental Law for the Practicing Lawyer, p. 182. It is
worth noting here that one of the projects that has developed from the Airlie Conference
is the publication of the Environmental Law R~eporter by the Environmental Law Institute in Washington. The Reporter is more than just a newsletter and a record of cases,
legislation, and administrative activity; it also attempts to digest current pending litigation, a service of potentially great import in a field that is developing so rapidly. Its
materials for January 1971 include an updated version of Moorman's presentation.
14

P. 375.

15 Pp. 67, 248, 337.
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THE TME FACTOR

Law and the Environment is a "Polaroid" photo of the environmental law movement as of September 1969. To a certain extent, we
may color it sepia-tone and place it in our memory album because it
has been overwhelmed by the rush of subsequent events. Since that conference, the movement has come a long way, through good times and

bad: the National Environmental Policy Act of 196916 has been passed
(providing, inter alia, for the establishment of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 1'7 and requiring the preparation and filing of
"environmental impact" statements 8 ) and perhaps undermined; 19 the
Water Quality Improvement Act of 197020 has been enacted and attempts to rationalize such problems as oil pollution 2' and the stubborn
refusal of the Atomic Energy Commission to consider questions of
22
thermal pollution due to the operations of its licensees; its companion statute, the Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970,23
provides strengthened staff support for the CEQ; most-but not allregulatory authority has been shifted, in a major reorganization, to a
new bureaucratic entity, the Environmental Protection Agency; 24 an
appellate court has refused to accept the standing of a major conservation group in a public interest lawsuit; 25 and there is a reported decision
that accepts, in passing, the idea of a constitutional right to a healthful
and clean environment. 26 These are only some of the developments on
the federal level. The movement is proceeding apace in the state houses
and localities as well.
The book attempts, through the use of footnotes, to keep the
reader abreast of some of these changes. One cannot dam Heraclitus's
river, however, especially at floodtide. Undoubtedly, the editors and
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. V, 1970).
17 Id. §§ 4341-47.
18 Id. § 4332.
19 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1970, at 23, col. 1. There have been other reports of the
law apparently being ignored. But as this review was being written, the Council on
Environmental Quality proposed rules that might end many such evasions. 36 Fed. Reg.
1398 (1971).
20 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1161-71 (1970).
21 Id. § 1161.
22 Id. 1171. See also New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (Ist Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1970).
23 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4371-74 (Supp. Sept., 1970).
24 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970).
25 Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted sub nom. Sierra
Club v. Morton, 400 U.S. - (1971) (No. 939).
26 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., I BNA ENVIRONamNr RFP.-DECiSIONS 1640 (D. Mont. Aug. 27, 1970).
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contributors to this volume realize this situation better than the reviewer does; the Airlie Conference was designed to marshal mutual
support and exchange strategies at a particular moment in the development of the law, not to produce an environmental hornbook. But the
inevitable conclusion is that the book that was produced is less valuable
today than it would have been if published immediately after the meeting, and its worth will unfortunately continue to lessen as time passes.
THE SELF-SERVING ASPECT

Much, if not most, of legal scholarship is not disinterested. Attorneys do not have to undertake their research and writing under the
guise of "objectivity" which supposedly governs work in the academic
social science disciplines. A legal author is apt to have gained his knowledge about the subject of his article by being involved in actual disputes
concerning the issues it presents. The lay person reading this book or
a similar work, however, may not realize that the various proponents
of different intellectual theories are simultaneously likely to be emotionally engaged in seeking judicial recognition for them. Thus, what
seems obvious to those of us in the fraternity may come as a bit of a
surprise to the general reader, even though many of the contributors
make a point of indicating their involvement. Roberts is the most
candid in this regard:
I also suspect that this kind of conference may be a law generating
device by which we throw out a citation and hope that some day
some judge finally cites the damn thing for his emotional conclusion because, trained
like a lawyer, he has to cite something that
27
says it's authority.
And yet, this "self-serving aspect" of the book represents, in my
mind, one of its valuable aspects. The conference participants are involved with the highest and best use of legal thinking, its creative function. Since so many areas of public decision-making display a paucity
of imagination (if not a total inability) for creating and evaluating
decision-alternatives, Law and the Environment serves as an excellent
record of how a group of committed persons can work at overcoming
this obstacle. If our society is ever going to be able to deal with the
complex problems it has allowed to arise, it will be precisely through
such a utilization of talents.
In this regard, the process of developing an environmental law
27 P. 249.
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can serve as a model for possible action in other apparently intractable
areas. The attempt to propound a constitutional right to a healthy and
decent environment, and to make such a notion intellectually respectable, is one prime example of this process. Others are the need to deal
with the factor of irreversibility in certain public decisions and the
need to challenge irresponsive and irresponsible bureaucracies. Law
can be an integrating and unifying mechanism, intimately tied to both
man's most profound normative questions as well as his most grubby
daily activities. And the adversarial mode by which it operates is seen
to have real value as a means of resisting the efforts to eliminatethrough consensus operations-deeply felt value differences and widespread citizen participation in public affairs.
CONCLUSION

Many of the preceding comments and observations are based on
the experience of using this book as a part of a course on the legal system and environmental control, designed primarily for non-law students in a variety of academic and professional disciplines. General
student reaction to it ranged from "current and cogent" to "spotty
quality-some readings better than others." However, there was a
fairly clear agreement that the book fails to stand on its own and takes
too much for granted on the part of the reader; it is useful as supplementary material to be read in conjunction with numerous other articles and monographs. Its incompleteness is particularly annoying in
view of its high price.
In sum, those of us interested in environmental law will continue
to appreciate the seminal importance of the 1969 conference, and will
continue to respect its participants as our teachers and trailblazers. But
the book, with its sloppy editing and typesetting, (the Index, for example, is incorrect in apparently all page references) 28 will elicit only
mixed satisfactions.
Philip L. Bereano*
28 Having had the privilege of examining the galleys, I suspect that the dtations

were to that pagination. I suggest that readers may wish to utilize my crude method of
error correction which is to "add 4" to all references as a first approximation.
* Assistant Professor, Environmental Engineering, Cornell University. B.Ch.E. 1962,
M.R.P. 1971, Cornell University; J.D. 1965, Columbia University.

